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Abstract 
 
Prominent transhumanists Julian Savulescu, Ingmar Persson, and Thomas 
Douglas argue that moral enhancement could solve global poverty. They argue 
that by engineering individuals with better moral dispositions, they will have 
better motives, and therefore the will to act more morally. These morally 
enhanced individuals will more effectively discharge their duties regarding global 
poverty, thus leading to more rapid poverty alleviation. 
 
In this paper I will present an account of the moral duties wealthy individuals hold 
to the global poor. These moral duties are not singular (either to do no harm or to 
provide assistance), but rather are complex and pluralist, and dependent on the 
position of the agent with regards to the global poor. Further, I will argue that the 
moral enhancement some transhumanists are envisioning to alleviate poverty fails 
to recognize the pluralist duties wealthy individuals have regarding poverty 
alleviation. In fact, moral enhancement would be counterproductive by virtue of i) 
failing to recognize our various moral reasons to alleviate global poverty ii) 
failing to allow individuals to evaluate their moral duties to others, therefore to 
effectively discharge them, and iii) that failing to recognize i) & ii) would bring 
about morally undesirable consequences; ineffective poverty alleviation and 
enhanced-individuals’ loss of autonomy. Therefore, even if we grant that 
individuals have only one reason to alleviate global poverty, it is not clear how 
moral enhancement can effectively address global poverty, since poverty 
alleviation is an issue that requires political, economic and institutional action. 
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In the first section of this thesis I will review transhumanism, specifically the 
"moral enhancement"(ME) proposition. In the second section I will present my 
pluralist account of the moral duties affluent individuals have to the poor. In the 
third section, I will analyse the transhumanist's proposal to alleviate global 
poverty via moral enhancement, and I will contrast their argument with my 
pluralist account of moral duties in order to determine if ME will achieve poverty 
reduction. 
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Section I 
 
We now stand in the vestibule of a vast new technological age, one that 
despite its capacity for human destruction, has an equal capacity to 
make poverty and human misery obsolete. If our efforts are wisely 
directed—and if our unremitting efforts for dependable peace begin to 
attain some success—we can surely become participants in creating an 
age characterized by justice and rising levels of human well-being.     
Eisenhower, State of the Union Address, Jan. 7, 1960. 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Transhumanism 
The definition of transhumanism has been widely revised and it is in constant 
change in response to technological advances. In the late 1980's an American 
futurist FM Esfandiary wrote the book "Are you a Transhuman" (1989) where 
he described the traits and characteristics of "emerging" transhumans. He 
described this new breed as a mixed group of individuals coming from 
different backgrounds, countries and professions, with only one thing in 
common; the use of technology. 
 
A transhuman is a 'transitional human' someone who by virtue of their 
technology usage, cultural values, and lifestyle constitutes an 
evolutionary link to the coming era of posthumanity. The 
signs...indicative of transhuman status included prostheses, plastic 
surgery, intensive use of telecommunications, a cosmopolitan outlook 
and a globetrotting lifestyle, androgyny, mediated reproduction (in vitro 
fertilization), absence of religious belief, and a rejection of traditional 
family values (Bostrom 2003: 11). 
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The link between technology and transhumanism was present in earlier 
definitions, although it is not entirely clear that all the characteristics 
envisioned by Esfandiary entirely relate to contemporary transhumanism. In 
other words the usage of the word trashuman in contemporary literature treats 
technology as a necessary condition of transhumanism. Esfandiary’s 
definition lists characteristics that do not pertain to technology, such as the 
rejection of religion and family values. Therefore his account is too broad and 
lacks precision.  
 
Then we are left with the question of what is transhumanism and how does it 
relate to enhancement. To begin with, in the field of bioethics transhumanism 
is presently considered a movement that promotes furthering natural human 
capacities via enhancements. In other words transhumanism purports to 
modify or alter profound aspects of our normal human capacities, and how we 
exist as humans. This movement is especially interested in technologies 
relating to life extension, genetical engineering, and cognitive and moral 
enhancements. Human enhancement is therefore a tool through which the 
transhumanist ideals can be achieved. "Transhumanism...promotes an 
interdisciplinary approach to understanding and evaluating the opportunities 
for enhancing the human condition and the human organism opened up by the 
advancement of technology. Attention is given to both present 
technologies...and anticipated future ones" (Bostrom 2003: 493). 
 
Transhumanists view human nature as something that can and should be 
modified to extend our capacities. In a way they see the natural and normal 
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human capacities as limitations that can be overcome to satisfy our needs and 
help us become a new and better type of human.  
 
Transhumanists view human nature as a work-in-progress, a half-baked 
beginning that we can learn to remold in desirable ways. The current 
state of human beings need not be the endpoint of evolution. 
Transhumanists hope that through the responsible use of science, 
technology, and other rational means we shall eventually manage to 
become post-human, beings with vastly greater capacities than present 
human beings have (Bostrom 2003: 493). 
 
2. Intrinsic Vs. Positional Benefits 
Transhumanism then is not simply a lifestyle as Esfandiary proposes, but 
something more profound that requires active engagement with technology 
which permanently changes human beings. These changes, whether physical 
or mental, go beyond humans' normal/natural capacities. Some 
transhumanists (See Bostrom: 2005) have proposed that humans ought to 
adopt the enhancements with intrinsic benefits and avoid the ones that are 
simply positional. Enhancements that generate positional advantages only 
provide an advantage insofar as others lack them. For instance, enhancing 
humans to be taller only brings a positional advantage to the taller individual 
because other people are shorter. Conversely, enhancements with intrinsic 
benefits would provide shared benefits, or as Bostrom calls them "net positive 
externalities (such as better immune systems)" (2005: 15). Enhancements 
with intrinsic benefits would primarily deal with life extension; this would 
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enhance individuals to live longer without deteriorating his/her life quality. 
Cognitive enhancement would make individuals more intelligent on the 
assumption that it would lead to better lives. Some philosophers (See Harris: 
2011) believe cognitive enhancement is a necessary condition for moral 
enhancement and argues that in order for individuals to be more moral we 
ought to improve their reasoning capacities. Others, including Savulescu, 
Persson and Douglas believe that moral enhancement can be accomplished 
via regulating certain chemical reactions in the brain to enhance individuals' 
moral dispositions. Finally, mood enhancements (See Kramer: 1993) would 
allow individuals to maximize their positive emotions and discount 
unpleasant ones. 
 
My thesis will not address all of the moral questions raised by 
transhumanism, nor will it analyse in depth the specifics of all human 
enhancements. Rather, in what follows, I will explicate specifically moral 
enhancement (ME) which directly relates to global poverty. 
 
3. Dual-Use Dilemma and Moral Enhancement (ME) 
Many existing technologies face the "dual-use dilemma" (See Miller and 
Selgelid: 2007). This moral dilemma arises when in science and research, 
technology or information can be used for both moral and immoral purposes. 
The dilemma is if such technology should be developed and deployed for a 
good cause when it may also be used to cause great harm. For example, 
biological research in the field of immunology (vaccines), and the 
experimentation with new virus' strains could bring great advances in science 
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and potentially save lives, but could also be used to design and spread deadly 
diseases. 
 
Some proposed enhancements, such as cognitive enhancement or life 
extension might also face dual-use dilemmas. Since we live in societies where 
great social and economic differences exist between countries, it is not only 
reasonable to be cautious about technologies that can potentially greaten the 
gap between rich and poor, but it is also essential that we promote an 
egalitarian society using technology as a tool, not solely as a means to further 
wealthy individuals. For that reason we ought to ensure that such 
enhancements occur for a moral end, and are not used to harm or to reinforce 
unequal opportunities between individuals. In the case of ME the proposition 
is different, because its only goal is to enhance individuals to become more 
moral. In other words, if ME can fulfil its promise to create more moral 
humans, and if it is universally applied, then ME would be immune to dual-
use dilemmas, since the results of such enhancement can allegedly only bring 
good/moral consequences. Because some of the moral issues human 
enhancements raise can be overcome by having morally enhanced individuals 
undertaking human enhancing procedures, ME is seen by the transhumanists 
as a priority over other forms of enhancements as it can promote a more just 
society (Savulescu 2010: 12). 
 
Persson and Savulescu (2010) envision ME being successfully implemented 
by regulating the neurotransmitter, serotonin, in our brains. They use the 
example of an “ultimatum game” in which two participants interact to divide 
6 
   
a sum of money. In the game both participants know the total sum, but only 
one can propose how to split it. If the second participant accepts the money, 
then they split it according to what the first participant proposed. Savulescu 
and Persson argue that individuals tend to reject unfair proposals; if the split 
is not 50/50 the individual prefers to make a statement and punish the unfair 
offer, even though they receive no money. They further argue that because 
identical twins, which have been separately brought up, have similar 
responses in this ultimatum game (Cesarini: 2008), then acts of fairness and 
justice could be linked to brain responses to serotonin. Therefore they 
conclude that if we could regulate serotonin in the brain moral enhancement 
could be achieved. 
 
Douglas (2008) envisions moral enhancement in a different way. He argues 
that by promoting better future motives, individuals would be morally 
enhanced. "A person morally enhances herself if she alters herself in a way 
that may reasonably be expected to result in her having morally better future 
motives”. He understands these future motives to be "psychological — 
mental or neural — states or processes that will, given the absence of 
opposing motives, cause a person to act, taken in sum, than she would 
otherwise have had." (Douglas 2008: 229). According to him ME could be 
achieved by decreasing the degree of "counter-moral emotions". He identifies 
two of these emotions, first a decrease in ‘a strong aversion to certain racial 
groups' and second ‘the impulse towards violent aggression'. Similar to 
Savulescu and Persson he thinks that through regulating neurological 
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reactions and certain neurotransmitters in the brain, moral enhancement 
technologies could be developed (2008: 233). 
 
Savulescu, Persson and Douglas envision ME as something desirable which 
would promote pro-social behaviours benefiting society at large. One of the 
strongest arguments that Savulescu and Persson make is that ME should not 
be seen as one among many possible enhancements, rather as a separate and 
more important enhancement. They argue that enhancements in general could 
be beneficial but only insofar as individuals act more morally. In other words 
for all enhancements to be successful individuals ought to become more 
moral, otherwise injustices and inequalities will occur.  
 
Without moral enhancement, other techniques of biomedical 
enhancement seem likely to increase global injustice. For instance, if 
any techniques of life extension are discovered, they will probably be 
employed to further extend the lives of people in the most developed 
countries, though their lives are already on average almost twice as long 
as the lives of people in the poorest countries (Savulescu 2010: 13). 
 
Further, Savulescu (2010: 8) explicitly argues that through ME we could 
solve most of the world’s issues, in particular global poverty. He argues that 
by enhancing humans in the developed world, individuals would be more 
efficient in discharging their positive duties, hence more willing to donate 
money. Similarly, Douglas argues that individuals have suboptimal good 
motives; hence global poverty can be attributed to individuals having these 
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deficits (2008: 230). Therefore the way he envisions ME not only deals with 
suppressing counter-moral emotions, but it can also be extended to directly 
promote pro-social behaviours. In other words, ME could give individuals 
better motives that would in turn promote actions of assistance and 
beneficence. Following his argument, morally enhanced individuals that have 
better motives would perhaps be more empathetic and more likely to assist 
others. 
 
Savulescu and Persson also favour ME on the basis that it is necessary for any 
other human enhancements to be morally successful. Their argument draws 
on Bertrand Russell's essay "Icarus: The Future of Science" (See Bostrom: 
2005) where he argues that we should be cautious in the way we accept and 
implement technologies that can change our humanness. "Without more 
kindliness in the world, technological power would mainly serve to increase 
men's ability to inflict harm on one another" (Russell: 1924). I would agree 
that a society where individuals are moral is desirable, and that behaviours 
that promote fairness and justice would lead to good outcomes. The question 
is: should a more moral world be brought about through ME or through 
traditional means of moral education? 
 
4. Objections to ME 
Now that we have a clear picture of moral enhancement, I will consider 
several objections to ME and provide some responses to those concerns in 
order to determine if they are legitimate and morally significant. After having 
addressed these objections I will conclude by arguing that the ME envisioned 
by transhumanists is untenable and morally undesirable. 
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      4.1.  Behavioural Genetics and Neuroscience  
Chan and Harris (2011) argue that relying on the regulation of serotonin in 
the brain, for ME to succeed, is a mistake and would in fact be 
counterproductive. Recent research (Crockett: 2010), which tested if there is a 
relation between levels of serotonin in the brain and moral behaviour, 
suggests that regulating serotonin in the brain during "ultimatum games" and 
"trolley cases" did not lead to pro-social behaviours. In fact in many cases it 
did not allow individuals to come to the most moral solution. "From the 
reported research, the effect of serotonin seems to be to make subjects more 
responsive to immediate emotional engagement and less likely to reason 
beyond their instant protective reaction" (Harris 2011: 130). 
 
Further, Harris argues that in some circumstances when discounting counter-
moral emotions (Douglas) the outcome may be desirable, but in other cases it 
can be disastrous because it will lead to individuals being unable to 
effectively respond to specific circumstances. He gives the example of Jasper 
Schering, a passenger on flight 253, who on December 26 2009 attacked and 
restrained a hijacker that was attempting to take control of the plane. Because 
of his violent response he was able to save the lives of hundreds of people. 
Harris argues that an individual that had been morally enhanced, would not 
have been able to attack and save the rest of the passengers, instead he 
perhaps would have been paralysed and unable to react heroically (Harris 
2011: 131). 
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Harris' concerns are persuasive for three different reasons: 
 1) Counter-moral emotions are not necessarily bad and are often desirable in 
cases where these emotions are used as a survival instinctive mechanism or to 
maintain peace and order. Similar to the previous case we could also imagine 
other cases where a violent reaction is not only permissible but also 
obligatory. For instance we can think of police officers and soldiers who have 
a duty to maintain peace, in many cases, with the use of violent force. We 
may be inclined to think that in some isolated cases the use of violence is 
permissible but not as a general rule, and that the world would be much less 
violent with ME. The point is that violence itself is not something morally 
desirable; it is desirable insofar as it is instrumental in cases like the hijacker 
or the police officer. The fact that violence can be instrumental and 
sometimes obligatory should be maintained as part of our own judgment and 
reasoning, and not simply blocked from our brains. Point three will deal more 
specifically with the issue of autonomy. 
 
2) The science for successfully implementing ME is underdeveloped and 
cannot yet fulfil ME’s promise. At this point in time we are far from 
determining how, and if our brains can be induced to make us behave 
morally. The claim, that regulating serotonin in the brain can make 
individuals more moral, has been rejected by recent studies. It may be the 
case that in the future we will be able to accurately determine individuals’ 
moral dispositions however in the present, science cannot yet fulfil ME’s 
promise to make more moral individuals. 
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3) ME will hinder individuals' capacity to act effectively in any given 
situation, therefore individuals will partly lose their autonomy. Morally 
enhanced individuals would react based on what they are programmed to do 
and would lose the capacity to act based on their own moral reasoning. 
Similar to the hijacker’s case, morally enhanced individuals would not be 
able to reflect, judge and weigh risks when dealing with situations that require 
action, and would lose the capacity to fully function as moral agents. 
 
Based on the science and information we have to this day and the moral risk 
of employing ME when we are uncertain about its full effects renders Harris’ 
concerns well founded and relevant. Therefore, the moral risks of ME might 
outweigh the benefits. 
 
      4.2.  ME: An Unnatural Practice  
There are two separate objections that argue ME (transhumanism) is 
unnatural. Both of these objections have been prominently argued by Leon 
Kass (1997) who served as George Bush bioethics advisor. First, he argues 
that we should consider our gut reaction of repugnance when thinking about 
these technologies which is a result of recognizing something that we ought 
to avoid, as it can dehumanize us by changing "traditional meanings" (life 
cycle, sex, work).  
 
In crucial cases … repugnance is the emotional expression of deep 
wisdom, beyond reason's power to fully articulate … we intuit and feel, 
immediately and without argument, the violation of things we rightfully 
12 
   
hold dear … To pollution and perversion, the fitting response can only 
be horror and revulsion; and conversely, generalized horror and 
revulsion are prima facie evidence of foulness and violation (Kass 
1997: 22). 
 
Kass' objection is mistaken because he gives emotions too much importance 
when determining the moral desirability of ME. We don't want to say that the 
repugnance and revulsion white people felt towards black people in the 
antebellum South1 was an expression of deep wisdom as Kass argues. It is 
important to consider our emotions as morally significant, that is not to say, 
they are the sole component of philosophical reasoning. In other words 
emotions matter, but are not decisive.  
 
The second objection states that it is unnatural to engage with technologies 
that can change our natural/normal capacities and that this unnaturalness 
gives individuals reasons not to engage in ME. To address this claim I will 
use J. S Mill's concept of naturalness (1904). He argues that the concept of 
nature has two principal meanings and that these are often misrepresented. 
The first meaning says that nature is “the entire system of things, with the 
aggregates of all their properties”. The second is a meaning “that denotes 
things as they would be, apart from human intervention” (1904: 21). In the 
first, he argues that it is a mistake to think that humans can create unnatural 
things, because nature and what is natural is everything, simple or complex 
                                                
1 Period of time (1781-1860) in the United States of America when slavery was widely used. 
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where all phenomena take place. Therefore, all men’s actions are, in one way 
or another, a manifestation of nature, because men have only power to do 
what is natural. "Nature, then, in this, its simplest, acceptation, is a collective 
name for all facts, actual and possible…” he further says “For, in the sense of 
the word “nature” which has just been defined, and which is the true scientific 
sense…everything which is artificial is natural” Mill (1904: 3).  
 
In the second meaning he argues that it is irrational and immoral to accept 
that man ought to follow nature, because all human actions, one way or 
another, consist in altering the spontaneous course of nature (1904: 22). 
Mill’s account focuses on an important point regarding our perception of 
what is permissible based on what is natural, and how that perception is 
somewhat arbitrary. Following his account, it would be a mistake to reject the 
whole notion of transhumanism on the basis that it is unnatural, and if we do, 
we then have to reassess every aspect of the way we live in today's societies. 
For instance if we consider the transhumanist proposition of "life extension" 
to be an unnatural technology, we would then be committed to think that 
using technology such as medicine to heal, which equals life extension to also 
be unnatural. So far these two objections of transhumanism, one based on 
repugnance and the other on naturalness, do not provide valid moral reasons 
to reject ME and more work needs to be done to substantiate their claims 
against the transhumanist’s proposals.  
 
There is another argument that draws upon the naturalness concept but from a 
different angle. This argument focuses on a contentious distinction between 
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treatment and enhancement, which some argue is morally significant (See 
Kass: 2003). Kass holds the view that treatment is permissible and 
enhancement is not, on the basis that treatment is something that is restoring a 
human to its natural condition, that is, medication even if considered artificial 
is simply restoring humans to their natural state. Contrary to that view others 
such as Roache and Bostrom (2008) argue that a moral distinction between 
treatment and enhancement simply does not exist. They argue that if those 
who encourage that distinction refer to the average human capacities as 
natural, then, their argument is irrational and implausible, because they will 
have to provide answers where the natural is also not the average. Consider 
the following example: The average intelligence of a person is 90-110 IQ. If 
an individual is born with an IQ of 130 (higher than average), and later in life 
develops a condition that decreases her IQ to 110, the individual's natural 
cognitive capacities when she was born (130 IQ) went beyond the average 
human, and if we could treat the condition that made her IQ decrease, would 
we consider that an enhancement because it is making her more intelligent 
than the average person or should we deny a treatment based on her IQ now 
placing her within the average? For people like Kass who hold that a 
distinction between treatment and enhancement exists, they will be obligated 
to provide answers in cases like this, where what is natural is also not the 
average. More importantly it fails to recognize three things 1) the capacities 
of individuals cannot be measured by an average count, 2) that these vary 
between different individuals, and 3) that these fluctuate throughout the 
lifespan of individuals. Therefore the treatment vs. enhancement distinction 
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does not offer a tenable objection against trashumanism, and it is only 
problematic to those who hold it exists (Bostrom: 2008).  
 
Defining the therapy-enhancement distinction is a problem only for 
those who maintain that this distinction has practical or normative 
significance. Those who hold that therapy is permissible, or worthy of 
support, or an appropriate target for public funding, but that 
enhancement is not, are affected by all the difficulties mentioned 
above...Transhumanists (advocates of human enhancement) are 
unaffected by the problems associated with maintaining that there are 
important differences between enhancement and therapy (Bostrom 
2008: 3)  
 
We may think the above distinction is not entirely based on a simple 
dichotomy, rather, that a consideration ('internality constraint') is also needed 
to distinguish between enhancements and treatments. This consideration 
differentiates between treatment and enhancements on the basis that 
enhancements require an "internal" (body) intervention. If we want to 
maintain this consideration, then we are faced with the problem of how 
internal an intervention needs to be for it to be counted as an enhancement.  
For instance, there are some practices such as wearing glasses that enhance 
our sight, but what is the difference, morally speaking, between wearing 
glasses and having surgery to permanently improve our sight? If we maintain 
that a moral distinction exists between enhancements and treatments based on 
the former being an internal procedure in the body, hence morally 
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undesirable, then we will be committed to denying lifesaving procedures. 
Therefore, it is not clear why or if a distinction that is morally significant 
exists that relies on an “internality constraint”. These previously discussed 
arguments against transhumanism based on an internality constraints and the 
treatment vs. enhancement distinction do not provide enough reasons to 
successfully reject the transhumanist claim. (Bostrom: 2008) 
 
The objections previously presented are focused on concepts of what 
constitutes the "natural". The objections towards the desire to enhance our 
human capacities are often presented with an undertone that implies a 
somehow forbidden act of "playing god". That is not to say that all objections 
to transhumanism are unfounded or invalid, simply that the ones focused on 
naturalness, a treatment vs. enhancement distinction and that hold an 
“internality constraint” are not morally persuasive. 
 
      4.3.  Transhumanism Promotes Inequalities and Abuse 
It is reasonable to think that transhumanism may increase inequality, since the 
technologies that have the potential to make fundamentally different humans, 
could possibly promote a greater separation between rich and poor, and 
perhaps even the subjugation of those most vulnerable2. Technology and its 
availability/accessibility is very much related to the economic power of a 
country. For that reason in today's world we could expect only some 
                                                
2 For a further discussion on how technology is widening the gap between rich and poor see 
Emeagwali “Around the Globe, Technology Widens Rich-Poor Gap” (2009) 
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individuals to benefit from new technologies. This raises important moral 
issues that perhaps are not inherent to transhumanism but that still need to be 
considered and that inevitably, based on today’s societies, could lead to more 
social inequalities. (See Silver: 1998) 
 
Other bioethicists such as Annas, Andrews and Isasi (2002) have been critical 
about transhumanism on the basis that creating a new species would promote 
conflict and even genocide. They say that if we develop humans that are more 
intelligent or moral, it would not only make a greater gap between rich and 
poor but also create a new and more profound gap between the enhanced new 
species and the "normal" human. The former would most likely be treated as 
an inferior species; therefore they could be considered savages and might be 
subjected to slavery and slaughter. 
 
These are legitimate concerns and based on the long record of human history 
where vulnerable individuals and groups have been subjected to exploitation 
and domination. We could reasonably expect this tendency to continue. 
Suppose that in the near future, we discover a costly way to make individuals 
more intelligent, only affordable to the very wealthy. These newly enhanced 
individuals would differ from the majority of the world's population. This 
enhancement would be a type of "positional advantage" which would give 
them a benefit insofar as others lack it. Therefore we could reasonably expect 
those individuals to use their enhanced capacities for their own benefit and 
perhaps even for domination. 
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Savulescu might respond to this particular problem saying that ME should be 
immune to these objections, because ME should precede any other type of 
enhancements. Before individuals are enhanced to be more intelligent they 
will first be more moral. The problems with Savulescu's view are 1) it is 
unlikely that all individuals will be morally enhanced before they are 
cognitively enhanced, 2) there would be significant incentives to undergo 
cognitive enhancement first, and 3) if only some people can be cognitively 
enhanced, because of its cost, then they would be likely to mistreat the non-
enhanced. This does not mean that the objection of transhumanism promoting 
inequalities renders ME invalid, simply that we have to recognize that these 
are legitimate concerns that we ought to consider prior to engaging in any 
form of human enhancement. 
 
      4.4.  Means and Ends 
The last objection to transhumanism, which directly relates to ME, is the 
notion that the process by which individuals accomplish their goals is morally 
significant. Kass (2003) argues that individuals, while learning and improving 
themselves, consider their achievements to be important and perhaps even 
more important is the process by which they accomplish these achievements. 
For example an individual that is trying to become more intelligent by 
exercising his brain through solving mathematical problems. The process that 
this individual goes through, of laborious study, reflection and even struggle 
has a direct relationship to what the individual is setting up to achieve. Thus, 
there is something morally important about the process. Kass argues that if 
that achievement is simply accomplished via human enhancement the morally 
19 
   
significant process, which allows individuals to self-reflect, set goals, and so 
on, is lost. 
 
In most of our ordinary efforts at self-improvement, either by practice 
or training or study, we sense the relation between our doings and the 
resulting improvement, between the means used and the end sought. 
There is an experiential and intelligible connection between means and 
ends; we can see how confronting fearful things might eventually 
enable us to cope with our fears. We can see how curbing our appetites 
produce self-command. … In contrast, biomedical interventions act 
directly on the human body and bring about their effects on a subject 
who is not merely passive but who plays no role at all. He can at best 
feel their effects without understanding their meaning in human terms. 
(Kass 2003: 22) 
 
Bostrom argues that as long as the end goal is valuable, the process by which 
it is achieved is not relevant. In other words, the end result (goal) has value 
"independently of the means it was achieved" (2008: 13). By that he means 
that, for example, if an individual is trying to lose weight and decides to go 
through surgery which makes the individual achieve that goal in a matter of 
hours, then the goal in itself has an independent value from the process, even 
if that person did not go through the traditional process of dieting, exercise 
etc. Further, that frequently individuals act not based on the value of what a 
particular process might bring, rather on the end result, like when we catch 
the bus instead of walking. In this case perhaps walking could bring extra 
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value to the individual but there is an independent value in arriving faster and 
on time to work.  
 
Kass argues the process matters, while Bostrom argues the end goal matters. 
Both are right. But Bostrom is saying as long as the end goal is valuable, we 
should do it. Kass would argue that we should not abandon the value in the 
process, even if there is an end goal value. I find Bostrom's argument 
mistaken for three reasons. 1) He fails to realize that there is a direct relation 
between means and ends, which are dependent on one another. That is, if the 
individual sets a goal to lose weight but instead of jogging to work catches 
the bus because she knows that on the bus she can get a "magic" pill that will 
do the job, then we can say she has lost something valuable by taking the bus, 
namely the process of working towards ones ends, even if she achieves the 
ultimate goal. Bostrom fails to make that important distinction between 
working through ones means/ends and something that is simply valuable in 
itself. We can mostly agree that jogging to work is healthier than driving, but 
this is only relevant in our conversation if my goal is to lose weight or 
exercise, and not if it is to arrive early to work. Conversely if my goal is to 
arrive early to work, then perhaps what is valuable is not jogging but driving. 
2) Recent studies suggest that working through ones goals offers an important 
educational value (See Berns: 2004). A study in which individuals that had to 
work and struggle to earn money rather than just receiving it as a gift, showed 
more areas of brain activity and felt happier, suggesting that working through 
ones goals has moral significance. 3) If I draw a parable between Bostrom's 
argument (ends having an independent value) and poverty alleviation, we can 
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identify how important the value of the process is. For instance if we decide 
to address global poverty by providing mosquito nets to poor individuals, we 
would agree that the end goal (to provide as many mosquito nets as we can) is 
valuable in itself, but we cannot ignore that the value of the process is as 
important as the end goal. If the process to give away the mosquito nets is 
done indiscriminately we could be affecting local industries, the recipients of 
the nets might not value what they have been given, and in the future they 
might expect more handouts instead of working themselves to improve their 
lives (See Duflo: 2011). Since there is a direct relation between means and 
ends, the process to achieve our ends cannot be simply dismissed as Bostrom 
argues. It is then clear that there is a moral value in working through ones 
ends. This is not to say categorically that ME would deny individuals the 
opportunity to experience the process of working through ones ends. Simply 
it is to argue that what Savulescu and Douglas envision for ME makes 
individuals insensitive towards the value of the process, and it denies them 
from valuing it, which in the case of poverty alleviation, can have morally 
undesirable consequences. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Trashumanism proposes that it is morally desirable for humans to transcend 
their normal capacities by the use of enhancements. Based on that premise 
transhumanism faces the following objections: 4.1. The science that 
transhumanism uses to support its premises is underdeveloped, hence morally 
risky, 4.2. Transhumanism is unnatural, 4.3. Transhumanism promotes 
22 
   
inequalities and abuse, and 4.4. Transhumanism fails to recognize the 
interdependent value of "means and ends". 
 
Based on the previous assessment and how trashumanism/ME responds to 
these objections, I do not object to transhumanism as a whole, nor I argue that 
the implausibility of ME is absolute. Simply that at this point in time ME will 
struggle to live up to the transhumanists' expectations. Perhaps the objections 
that are raised against ME can easily be outweighed if ME can fulfil its 
promise to solve one of society’s most pressing issues, namely, global 
poverty. 
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Section II 
 
Savulescu, Bostrom and Persson argue that through ME individuals will be 
able to discharge their moral duties better or act more morally. They envision 
that once individuals are enhanced they will have the will to act against 
poverty by becoming more beneficent and empathetic, and will be able to 
alleviate global poverty by effectively discharging their beneficence to the 
poor. The trashumanists' view is exclusively focused on positive duties (the 
moral duty to assist others), and it strongly suggests that global poverty is an 
issue that can simply be solved through the actions of individuals in affluent 
nations. In what follows I will present my pluralist account of the moral 
duties affluent individuals have to the poor, the extent of those duties, and 
how they ought to be discharged effectively. In this account I will show how 
the moral responsibilities and duties affluent individuals have to the poor are 
not determined by a single-factor (beneficence). Wealthy individuals' moral 
duties to the poor should be sensitive to a) the degree to which the agent has 
caused the harm, b) the degree to which she intended it, c) the epistemic 
limitations she faced in undertaking the action, and d) the capacity she has to 
help. 
 
6. Moral Duties to the Poor 
One philosophical debate concerning global poverty is about the type of 
moral reasons affluent individuals have for addressing global poverty. These 
moral reasons are commonly seen as two kinds. First, some reasons are seen 
as morally stringent based on a causal connection between the duty bearer 
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and the deprived individual, in which the individual's poverty is a result of an 
action or group of actions done by the duty bearer. A second class of moral 
reasons is duties of assistance. These duties are non-relational. That is, the 
duty bearer owes assistance to the deprived individual independently of any 
causal or associational relationship they might have. The former set of duties 
is usually referred to as negative duties3 which wealthy individuals have to 
the poor based on the harms they have committed. The latter sets of duties are 
usually referred to as positive duties which wealthy individuals have towards 
the poor based on principles of assistance. 
 
7. Positive Duties 
One widely endorsed position is that affluent individuals have moral duties to 
the poor grounded on principles of beneficence and assistance. These 
principles are understood as the capacity an agent has to prevent harm from 
happening. It is commonly thought that duties of assistance are not legally 
binding, therefore can be exercised at the individual's discretion. In other 
words, these duties are grounded on promoting the good of others, and are 
mostly understood as acts of altruism (See Beauchamp: 2008). 
 
                                                
3 The stringency of these duties in how they are weighed against another is often debated, 
although in this essay I will refer to the "moral asymmetry principle" by which a duty to 
assist is less stringent than a duty not to harm. That is to say, that if two proportionate 
variables exist, one a duty to assist and another not to harm, it is usually understood that the 
duty not to harm is more stringent.  
25 
   
There are two views about duties of assistance. On one hand, Kantians argue 
that acts of beneficence and generosity are not morally obligatory (stringent), 
although desirable, they cannot be forced upon individuals. "Because we 
cannot be compelled to adopt ends, but must do so from free choice…we 
must impose them on ourselves." (Homiak: 2011) On the other hand, Singer 
(2009) makes a stronger claim by arguing that we are morally required to 
discharge our duties of assistance, because there is no clear moral distinction 
between contributing to harm, and failing to assist. Hence individuals have 
very demanding duties of assistance. The notion that moral duties of 
assistance are stringent and morally obligatory is not exclusive to Singer. 
Others like Unger (1996) have argued that wealthy individuals have strong 
obligations to donate money to the poor, and that our moral intuitions, when it 
comes to poverty alleviation, are often flawed, although, for the purpose of 
this paper I will focus on Singer's argument. 
 
Singer argues that positive duties are stringent and demanding and that 
making a moral distinction based on causal contributions is a mistake and 
goes against our moral intuitions. He grounds his argument on the following 
case of the helpless drowning child. An individual happens to be passing by, 
but he is late for a meeting and wearing expensive clothes. If he saves the 
child his clothes might get wet and he might be late for his meeting. Singer 
argues that the individual, without having to sacrifice anything morally 
comparable to a child's life, ought to save the child. Based on that conclusion 
he uses an analogy to then say that saving a drowning child is akin to saving 
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the global poor, hence, by donating money we are morally required to stop 
global poverty. 
 
First premise: Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and 
medical care are bad. 
Second premise: If it is in your power to prevent something bad from 
happening, without sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong 
not to do so. 
Third premise: By donating to aid agencies, you can prevent suffering 
and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care, without 
sacrificing anything nearly as important. 
Conclusion: Therefore, if you do not donate to aid agencies, you are 
doing something wrong (Singer 2009: 21). 
 
I will present two objections against Singer's argument. First, I object to his 
monist account of moral duties. Second, I argue he oversimplifies a complex 
issue, leaving most of the essential components that can morally help assess 
the situation absent and presupposes that complex problems have simple 
solutions (See Wisor: 2011).  
 
His first argument is problematic because he assumes that global poverty is 
solely an issue of wealthy individuals extending their altruism, rather than a 
political one. Similar to the "shallow pond case" there are plausible cases in 
which our moral contributions to some individuals are exclusive to duties of 
beneficence, for example, when a poor country suffers from a catastrophic 
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natural disaster. Here we can grant that wealthy individuals’ moral duties to 
the poor (in this specific case) are solely based on positive duties. However, it 
is a mistake to generalize our moral duties to the poor as being exclusively 
positive, because it ignores important considerations as to the state of the 
deprived individual, the cause of his state, and what or who brought it about. 
Also, there are many instances in which the state of the poor has come about 
from direct contributions of harm by other individuals. The state of the poor 
is seldom a case of bad luck, it is mainly human-driven (see Pogge: 2005). 
For example, we can think of an individual(s) that endangered a natural 
resource from a poor community in a foreign country because of reckless 
actions. The actions of this individual have worsened the situation of that 
community by making them poorer. According to Singer the moral duties 
wealthy individuals hold to the poor are demanding, and individuals have a 
moral obligation to donate money to alleviate poverty. The problem is the 
average wealthy individuals extending their altruism have not caused the 
impoverishment of that community. That is not to say, that wealthy 
individuals do not have a moral duty to assist those in need, simply that it is 
important to maintain that the culpable actor has more stringent moral 
obligations to rectify his wrongdoing, otherwise it is likely that moral 
obligations will shift to innocent actors. 
 
The second objection against Singer's account is that acting from the monist 
position will result in less poverty reduction. To better understand the moral 
importance of these objections, consider the following example: Imagine an 
individual X walking down the road; he happens to see an individual Y that 
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has been brutally assaulted by another individual Z. Y needs immediate 
medical assistance. The options that X faces are (i) he can assist or (ii) he can 
do nothing about it and let Y die. This, like the shallow pond case, shows that 
we have a stringent duty to assist, but what is equally important is that we 
enquire and investigate who committed such wrongdoing (assuming that it 
was not in self-defence). This is important due to the fact that we as society 
do not want such wrongdoings to keep occurring; therefore by simply 
assisting we are not solving the real problem, namely capturing a killer on the 
loose. We can say the same about global poverty; we need to acknowledge 
that to properly assign moral responsibility we ought to clearly define who, if 
anyone, is contributing to the state of the poor in order to rectify it. 
 
Singer's monist account is also too strong, because a) it argues that a lack of 
beneficence from affluent individuals is equivalent to killing the poor. This 
makes his argument overly demanding and gives individuals immoderate 
responsibilities (See Barry and Øverland: 2011) and b) it equally assigns 
moral duties/obligations indiscriminately to all affluent individuals. If we 
grant that different actors hold dissimilar moral responsibilities, then failing 
to do so, will ineffectively distribute moral obligations, ask for retribution 
from the wrong agent, and leave morally culpable agents  unpunished.   
 
That is not to say, positive duties do not have a moral significance. The 
"shallow pond case" presents how these duties are intuitive and can be 
demanding depending on the context. Therefore, it is plausible to think that 
we as affluent individuals can contribute to the alleviation of poverty and that 
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in some instances the moral duties we have to the poor are based on positive 
duties, but it is implausible to assume that the moral duties we share to the 
poor are exclusively of one kind. 
 
8. Negative Duties 
Negative duties are understood as duties to not harm, or to not violate others 
rights. In other words, negative duties instantiate moral agents’ claims to not 
be harmed. These claims are often understood as being more stringent than 
positive duties by virtue of causally contributing to harm. Because of that 
causal contribution to harm they attract more stringent moral responsibilities. 
For instance if I push an individual off his bicycle, we think that the 
individual is injured because of my actions, therefore I have stringent moral 
obligations to compensate or rectify the situation. Whereas a bystander to this 
accident would have a weaker positive duty, namely to assist.  
 
When distributing moral duties, if there is a causal relationship between the 
actor, the action he undertakes and the consequence of the action, then it is 
understood that his action brings special (demanding) moral obligations. For 
instance Young argues that “all who participate by their actions in processes 
that produce injustice share responsibility for its remedy” (Young 2006: 125). 
Similarly, Thomas Pogge (2002) argues that in the case of poverty, wealthy 
individuals are not simply bystanders as in the bicycle example; instead they 
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have contributed to the impoverishment of individuals by upholding and 
forcing a political system, which only favours the rich4. 
 
The normative force of others' human rights for me is that I must not 
help uphold and impose upon them coercive social institutions under 
which they do not have secure access to the objects of their human 
rights. I would be violating this duty if, through my participation, I 
helped sustain a social order in which such access is not secure, in 
which blacks are enslaved, women disenfranchised, or servants 
mistreated (Pogge 2002: 66). 
 
He argues that global institutions have contributed to, and keep contributing 
to harm by employing policies that primarily benefit affluent individuals. 
According to him it is feasible to have an institutional order that does not 
deprive individuals from their rights and also one that avoids foreseeable and 
avoidable harms. "This institutional order is implicated in the reproduction of 
radical inequality in that there is a feasible institutional alternative under 
which such severe and extensive poverty would not persist. The radical 
inequality cannot be traced to extra-social factors (such as genetic handicaps 
or natural disasters) which, as such, affect different human beings 
differentially" (Pogge 2002: 199) 
                                                
4 For the purpose of this essay I will only focus on Pogge’s negative duties account. 
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Further, a way for affluent individuals to stop contributing to the harm of the 
poor can be done by reforming what he calls the three Ps. The first P he talks 
about, refers to wealthy nations protecting their markets from poor nations' 
cheap imports. The second refers to the invalidation of the international 
borrowing and resource privileges, which the economic global system confers 
to any state that comes into power by any means necessary. Finally, the third 
refers to a reformation of the pharmaceuticals’ industry so instead of profiting 
from strict patent protections, to profit in proportion to the health impact of 
the drug they have developed. These reforms will stop wealthy individuals 
from further harming the poor. (See Jaggar: 2010) 
 
Pogge's account accurately illustrates a type of moral duty, based on harming 
contributions by wealthy individuals to the poor. Although, not because he 
only focuses on negative duties and does not specifically addresses if 
individuals have positive duties to the poor, we can assume that we only have 
one reason to alleviate poverty or that most of our actions of altruism are in 
fact actions of compensation. Also his argument focuses on the international 
economic order; nonetheless he asserts that private individuals share a 
violation of a negative duty even if a causal connection cannot be explicitly 
attributed to specific individuals. "As ordinary citizens of the rich countries, 
we are deeply implicated in these harms. We authorize our firms to acquire 
natural resources from tyrants and we protect their property rights in 
resources so acquired. We purchase what our firms produce out of such 
resources and thereby encourage them to act as authorized." (Pogge 2002: 
142). The generalization he makes of all citizens sharing equal moral 
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obligations, clouds the way in which moral obligations should be distributed 
effectively. Since residents of wealthy states are heterogeneous and have 
undertaken more or less harmful actions through the government that 
represents them. In other words, it is not clear that they share the same moral 
duties based on their unique contributions. For that reason, generalizing a 
violation of negative duties to state and individuals is a mistake, because we 
are left with an unattainable notion that cannot provide any normative 
guidance for private individuals.  
 
It is conceivable that individuals might escape this responsibility by 
withdrawing from that order, emigrating, or becoming hermits, but in 
the real world these possibilities are feasible for few people, if any. 
Pogge argues that the best way of alleviating our culpability for global 
poverty is to diminish the injustice of the international 
institutions...through three independent institutional reforms that he 
calls minor. (Jaggar 2010: 5) 
 
His account assumes that because individuals (western societies) have elected 
the government that represents them, they should share responsibility of the 
actions of the state and its institutions. The problem is that it is unfair to 
many. Some individuals might do whatever is in their power to support the 
reforms Pogge argues about; although that does not mean that the reforms 
will be created. If they are not, and because of that, it is proven that poor 
individuals have been further affected, then it is not clear why all wealthy 
individuals should share similar moral obligations to compensate the poor. 
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Clearly the solution cannot be for individuals in that position to become 
hermits. Perhaps we simply need to distribute moral obligations more 
effectively. 
 
I have two concerns about Pogge's appeal to the causal contribution 
principle: one empirical, and one philosophical. Empirically, it is 
extremely difficult to determine the main causes of global poverty as 
well as dubious that most world poverty is the effect of global 
institutions. Philosophically, even if the principle were true, the extent 
of “our” responsibility for global poverty is complicated by our diverse 
agency relationships to institutions. (Satz 2005: 48) 
 
However, Pogge’s argument is plausible in some contexts. In some instances 
it could be possible to identify a causal connection between affluent 
individuals, global poverty and harming contributions. His account also 
reminds us of injustices the global economic order has perpetuated to the 
poor. "Pogge's strategy is appealing, not least because it accords with the 
widespread sense that there is something deeply unjust about many of the 
international institutions that have been established and supported by the rich 
countries" (Patten 2005: 21)  
 
9. Pluralist Duties 
Rubenstein (forthcoming) presents a pluralist account on the moral duties 
individuals hold when addressing global poverty. She argues that the moral 
duties individuals hold are not simply based on a single kind (positive or 
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negative). Rather she grounds moral duties based on "actor centred questions" 
and "case centred questions". Actor-centred questions look at responsibility 
from the point of view of a specific actor and ask what actions the actor 
should prioritize when there are different actions to undertake. Case-centred 
questions try to find who is responsible between different actors and their 
degree of responsibility, for global poverty, to precisely determine moral 
obligations. She argues that thinking of moral duties in terms of positive and 
negative duties is misleading. For instance there are cases in which it is 
morally better to discharge a positive duty (often thought of as less stringent 
than a negative duty) than to rectify an action that came to be from a direct 
harm.   
 
The type of questions she asks allow individuals to better determine the 
degree of responsibility, responsible actors, and what actions to prioritize 
when deciding on poverty alleviating activities, and also allows for a better 
understanding of the various reasons to address poverty. It also highlights, 
unlike the monists, that moral duties ought to be recognized in context. The 
moral obligations that arise from this process recognize that it cannot be 
assumed that individuals should hold the same reasons to alleviate poverty, 
because different considerations help determine moral obligations. Finally she 
argues that efficiency should also be considered and given a special status 
over other considerations. That is when deciding what alleviating actions to 
undertake, the agent should prioritize the action that can maximally alleviate 
poverty. 
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Even though I sympathize with her pluralist account and find it persuasive. I 
want two qualifications on her position. 1) Efficiency should not have a 
special status, but rather an equal status with other considerations, and 2) 
Context matters a great deal in determining a particular agent’s duties. On the 
first qualification she argues "Acting on causality-based reasons will also 
likely lead the actor to alleviate less poverty overall than will acting on 
efficiency-based reasons, because only the latter type of reason focuses 
entirely on maximally alleviating poverty" (forthcoming: 4). I grant that 
acting on causality-based reasons will not always trump acting on 
beneficence reasons, that is if the severity of the actions the agent has to 
undertake are disproportionate. To make this clear I will use her following 
question as an example. Should a government prioritize aid to a country that 
it invaded and occupied on false pretenses even though such aid might be 
inefficient in terms of cost, or should it instead use that money to aid people 
elsewhere where it could more effectively alleviate severe poverty? 
(Forthcoming: 17)  If we hold that efficiency reasons have a special status, 
and that acting on these reasons is more effective in alleviating poverty, then 
we could expect aid to go where it can do more good. Perhaps there are other 
actions that the agent can undertake that are maximally more efficient, even 
where we may not have causality-based reasons, than repairing damage 
that we have caused with our direct actions, but if the severities of both 
actions are equal and proportionate, as well as the other considerations, then 
the actor ought to prioritize and act on causality-based reasons, even if it will 
not maximally alleviate poverty.  A consideration of maximal/efficiency 
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should not have a higher "special status" (forthcoming: 33) than other 
considerations.  
Overall, the considerations that she presents offer a better solution to what the 
monists argue, but in presenting these considerations it is important that the 
context dictates the priorities of which poverty alleviating actions to 
undertake, the same way we will not say a negative duty is always more 
stringent than a positive. Similar to Barry’s contribution principle (2005), we 
have to add up all the components and considerations to better determine 
moral obligations. Therefore, maximal/efficiency should only play a role 
equal to other considerations (causality, intent, and so on). To make this 
clearer, consider the following example. An agent polluted a water reservoir 
in a foreign developing country, because of that the small community became 
more impoverished and their livelihoods are at risk. The culpable agent 
knows that cleaning the water reservoir will take a great sum of money and 
time. At the same time, a more populated neighbouring community has 
suffered from a malaria outbreak which is threatening the lives of thousands. 
The agent knows that providing mosquito nets to mitigate the epidemic will 
only cost a fraction of cleaning the water reservoir, and will also save more 
lives. The agent decides to provide mosquito nets claiming that it will 
maximally alleviate suffering. 
The agent in this case has a dual moral-duty, one to provide assistance and the 
other of reparation. As previously mentioned it is not always the case that 
violating a negative duty is more demanding than providing assistance. In 
both the water reservoir and malaria outbreak cases, it seems that inaction can 
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kill hundreds if not thousands of people. In this case there two reasons for the 
agent to act on maximally/efficiency reasons 1) To alleviate more poverty, 
and 2) To save money and perhaps evade his moral obligations.  
If we are dealing with a moral agent, then he would most likely do both, 
repair the water reservoir, and provide as much aid as possible to the 
neighbouring community. If we are dealing with an immoral agent, then he 
would most likely focus on saving money and evade his other moral 
obligations. My concerns to reach a conclusion that gives maximal/efficiency 
a special status when deciding what action to undertake, and when wealthy 
agents have directly contributed to the impoverishment of poor individuals 
are twofold. 1) History has shown that wealthy individuals profiting in 
developing countries often prioritize economic gain over moral reasons5. 
Therefore it is morally risky, and could easily let wrongdoers off the hook 
when it comes to their moral obligations. 2) There is something valuable 
about repairing, and compensating the damages one has created, not only to 
the culpable agent but also to the victim. Imagine that in the previous case the 
agent decides to provide cheap mosquito nets to the neighbouring community 
and then claim insolvency; forcing other agents to clean the mess they 
causally created. Even if other agents come in to fulfill the other individual’s 
moral obligations, then the victims and community will be left with a feeling 
of injustice and impunity.  
                                                
5 See Iris Young (2006) specifically her account of sweatshops in developing countries. 
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In the previous case it would be more desirable for the agent to repair the 
damages he created, and if it is possible, to then provide assistance to the 
neighbouring community. We have to remember that when it comes to 
actions of assistance, individuals in all places have a duty to assist, so even if 
one agent legitimately cannot provide aid, then the others that can should.  
Although Rubenstein’s account gives an unnecessary special status to 
maximal/efficiency poverty alleviating reason, she presents an accurate 
account of the considerations we ought to take to effectively distribute moral 
obligations. An effective way to do that is to acknowledge that the multiple 
actions of individuals and the states that represent them give rise to a range of 
moral reasons that determine overall obligations to poor individuals. Because 
individual agents have differential obligations, and both positive and negative 
duties apply to individuals, we cannot accept only one reason to avoid global 
poverty that a) reduces to either harm or assistance and b) that treats all 
individuals of affluent states equally. Due to these shortcomings, it is 
necessary to implement a pluralist account that recognizes multiple and 
sometimes conflicting duties. 
 
10.  The considerations we ought to take to determine moral obligations 
should be plural and sensitive 1)  to the degree to which the agent has caused 
the harm, 2) the degree to which she intended it, 3) the epistemic limitations 
she faced in undertaking the action, and 4) the capacity she has to give. 
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      10.1. Causality 
A moral reason that grounds affluent individuals’ duties to the poor is based 
on their actions that have causally created poverty or affected poor 
individuals (See Rubenstein). This reason is important to effectively 
determine moral obligations. Like the previous case of polluting the water 
reservoir in a poor community, the individual(s) responsible for this action 
has more stringent moral obligations than an individual that had nothing to do 
with the accident.  
 
     10.2.  Right Intention 
Individuals have stringent moral obligations if the actions they undertake 
intend to cause poverty. This consideration goes hand in hand with the 
previously presented causality-based reason. In one sense individuals can 
undertake an action that inadvertently causes poverty. In a second sense, 
individuals can undertake an action intending to cause poverty but not 
succeeding. And in a third sense, an individual can undertake an action 
intending poverty and succeeding. All three cases generate various moral 
obligations.  The case where poverty is caused as an accident brings only 
moral obligations insofar as to mend the damage. However if poverty arises 
as a result of an action intending to cause that poverty, we can expect 
stringent moral obligations and compensatory actions from the culpable 
agent(s). "The issue of intentions is relevant to the issue of global poverty 
because many actors, ranging from states to corporations, have an interest in 
keeping particular groups powerless— which often means keeping them 
poor." (Rubenstein forthcoming: 10) 
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     10.3.  Epistemic Obligations 
This condition refers to individuals having a moral obligation to find out 
certain things, which are sensitive to context and what is at stake, morally 
speaking. This moral requirement pertains to the moral obligations, which we 
ought to fulfil in order to discount the risk of violating a negative duty. "The 
thought here is that when making certain sorts of decisions, or preparing to 
take certain sorts of actions (or to refrain from taking certain actions), what is 
required of us from an epistemic point of view may be sensitive to what is at 
stake from a moral point of view" Guerrero (2007: 68). 
 
For instance, a group of individuals decide to open a factory in an 
impoverished country. The operation of the factory requires the use of large 
quantities of water, which they acquire from the local well. After a few 
months the well runs dry and the impoverished locals have no other source of 
water in the vicinity. Let us also think that after the well runs dry, the factory 
owners argue that they did not know that the well had only small quantities of 
water.  
 
In this case we could agree that it may be the case that the factory owners did 
not know the natural resource was limited, but also that we could reasonably 
think that the moral risk of running the well dry is significant because it can 
affect the economy of the town, the livelihood of the locals and even put 
individuals' lives at risk. Therefore, the epistemic moral obligations of the 
factory owners to investigate must be sensitive to the context of the situation 
(moral risk). In this case to at least find out the likelihood of the well running 
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dry, the effect it can have on the locals, and finally to act based on those 
findings. 
 
When dealing with epistemic moral obligations and the degree to which 
individuals are expected to investigate, it is not easy to determine when they 
are sufficient and reasonable. Therefore in order to assess moral culpability or 
harm contribution based on epistemic obligations, we could say that an 
individual is morally culpable if he/she is guilty of ignorance from where 
he/she acts, which is sensitive to context6. That is, moral assessment should 
not be sensitive only to the information a person had when acting, but more 
importantly, to the obligations individuals have to become informed based on 
the situation's moral risk (See Guerrero: 2007). 
 
     10.4.  Capacity to Effect Change 
A fourth moral reason that grounds affluent individuals’ duties to the poor is 
the degree to which an agent(s) has the capacity to undertake certain types of 
actions. The capacity reason can be applied in two ways. The first deals with 
the capacity an agent has to undertake poverty-alleviating actions 
(economical, cognitive and physical). The second deals with the capacity-
based obligations (professional) that an agent has to act in relation to poverty 
alleviation. For example a poor individual living in an affluent country, 
cannot be expected to equally discharge a duty of beneficence the same way 
as an affluent individual. Or the affluent individual cannot be expected to 
                                                
6 For a similar discussion on epistemic moral obligations see Zimmerman’s ignorance thesis. 
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discharge his duty to the same extent as an aid relief worker. Since in this 
paper we are primarily interested in the moral duties of individuals, it is 
important to simply say that the state generates specific moral obligations for 
specific individuals. 
 
11. Conclusion 
As I have shown throughout this section it is important to create better criteria 
for distributing moral obligations which can help individuals to effectively 
fulfil their moral obligations, but first, it is necessary to acknowledge that we 
have pluralist moral duties to the poor. Perhaps accepting a pluralist account 
for moral duties is more complex, and requires more work in order to 
effectively determine our moral obligations.  This should not be seen as a 
reason to reject the account, rather as a challenge that could offer an 
immeasurable reward which we have failed to accomplish for so many years, 
namely to reduce global poverty.  
 
This challenge is not simply a weak reason to act, or a reason to shyly invite 
others to follow, rather a strong statement requiring obligatory action. This 
challenge, could lead us to track wrongdoers, and make them accountable, 
therefore our harming contributions to the poor will be minimized. Only then 
can we provide effective humanitarian aid, as well as focusing on effective 
ways in which we can provide assistance to reform  poor nations’ policies, 
practices and institutions.  
 
 
43 
   
Section III 
 
So far I have presented how the trashumanists envision ME its effect on 
poverty alleviation, and I have also presented why the moral duties and 
reasons individuals hold when undertaking poverty alleviation actions are 
plural. These are determined by various and equal considerations that allows 
individuals to effectively alleviate poverty. 
 
In what follows I will argue that even if in certain situations affluent 
individuals only have a single moral duty/reason to alleviate poverty, then the 
effective way to discharge those duties is not simply by being beneficent, as 
the transhumanists argue in regards to ME. Rather, to acknowledge that 
global poverty is an issue of deeper implications, namely, of an economic, 
political and social nature that ought to be addressed by reason not solely 
altruism. Furthermore, because we have pluralist moral duties I will argue 
that the trashumanists are wrong and have a myopic view of global poverty, 
which focuses exclusively on one kind of duty (beneficence), and that reduces 
a complex issue to pure altruism. 
 
12. Global Poverty and ME 
So far in this paper I have presented an introduction of what transhumanism is 
and its proposition relating to ME. I have also presented my pluralist account 
of the moral duties individuals have to the poor and ways in which moral 
duties ought to be discharged to effectively alleviate global poverty. Finally 
in this section I will present in detail the ME account in direct relation to 
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poverty alleviation, how it is envisioned by the transhumanists and how it will 
emerge in relation to pluralist moral duties accounts.  
 
For this discussion it is not important to define the specifics of how such 
enhancement interventions could occur or if they are technologically 
plausible. We merely need to show that if it happens in the form envisioned 
by some transhumanists, then it would be counterproductive, and morally 
undesirable. That is not to say individuals ought not be morally enhanced. 
Many common activities in our society could be characterized as morally 
enhancing, such as moral education. The point is that morally enhanced 
individuals in the spirit of Savulescu, Douglas and Persson is what I will 
contend to be morally undesirable. 
 
13. ME according to Savulescu and Persson 
Savulescu and Persson argue in their paper "Moral Trashumanism" (2010) 
that it is imperative to morally enhance individuals in order to solve the most 
urgent issues (global poverty) in today's society, and that failing to do so, 
would be a harming contribution (negative duty violation). They also argue 
that the widely held act-omission doctrine (which stipulates that harming is 
more morally reprehensible than failing to assist) has continued to promote 
global poverty, by allowing individuals in the affluent world to justify not 
providing aid, hence failing to be altruistic.  
 
One factor behind the weakness of the inclination to aid is the hold that 
the act-omission doctrine has on our minds. An-other factor is just as 
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probably our limited altruism. But there is a further factor worth 
mentioning: the sheer number of subjects to whom we have to respond 
can present an obstacle to a proper response. While many of us are 
capable of vividly imagining the suffering of a single subject before our 
eyes and, consequently, feel strong compassion, we are unable vividly 
to imagine the suffering of hundreds, let alone thousands of subjects 
even if they are in sight. Nor could we feel a compassion that is 100 
times (or more) as strong as the compassion we feel for a single 
sufferer. Rather, the degree of our felt compassion is likely to remain 
more or less constant when we switch from reflecting upon the 
suffering of a single subject to the suffering of hundreds of subjects. 
(Savulescu and Persson 2010: 9) 
 
What is problematic about their argument which attributes global poverty to 
the act-omission doctrine, is that it misleads individuals and it’s also false. As 
previously discussed the problem regarding global poverty is not as simple as 
they see it, and it is not only about people being willing to assist or having a 
limited altruism. The problem lies in the way we assign moral obligations 
without focusing on considerations of causality, intent, capacity to effect 
change and epistemic obligations. In other words it is not simply an argument 
about positive duties being more stringent than negative or vice versa. Rather, 
that in order to effectively address global poverty we ought to acknowledge 
that our moral obligations vary depending on our individual actions. The fact 
that we widely accept only one reason to avoid global poverty, even when we 
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sometimes have no reason that clearly grounds our moral obligations, makes 
it more difficult for individuals to effectively alleviate poverty. 
 
I have previously presented Singer's argument on poverty alleviation and how 
saving a drowning child is akin to saving the global poor. I have also, 
hopefully successfully, objected to his argument. Savulescu and Persson’s 
argument resonates with Singer’s in three different ways. They both contend 
that 1) Positive duties are as stringent as negative; therefore reject the act-
omission doctrine 2) Individuals ought to be more moral in order to address 
global poverty, and 3) Failing to assist will contribute to the impoverishment 
and perhaps the death of poor individuals. I can then say that at least at first 
sight, Savulescu and Perssons’s argument appears to be invalid. 
 
In order to fully understand Savulescu and Persson’s approach and the effect 
it can have on poverty alleviation I will first present an argument on our 
moral obligations to the poor, and those we might have contributed to harm. 
This will be made in the same spirit as Wisor (2011). Second, I will present 
an argument based on the agent's morally desirable capacities such as critical 
thinking/reasoning that allows for the understanding of the complexities of 
social structures and interactions with others. 
 
First let us explain shallow pond thinking. According to Wisor it means that 
certain issues, –in his example global poverty– cannot be addressed utilizing 
a process by which critical thinking is not exercised. That is, shallow pond 
thinking boils down an issue to the point where most of its essential 
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components are lost, which could bring more harm than good. A few of the 
reasons why we ought not address issues in this manner is because it fails to 
recognize essential components that allow us to effectively assess any given 
situation and rectify any wrongdoing. For instance, according to Singer, 
individuals donating money can solve global poverty. The problem of course 
is not that individuals engage in acts of beneficence but that they do it without 
asking important moral questions, such as, why are these people poor, who or 
what is affecting them, are we contributing to their harm via our international 
institutions (See Pogge), what is the best way to help in relation to the needs 
of the poor etc.  
 
Savulescu and Persson’s approach to address global poverty via ME has some 
merit, in that they see global poverty as an issue that individuals ought to 
prioritize. They are envisioning a global change in which enhanced 
individuals would be more inclined to assist others, and extend their altruism. 
Although it is morally important to address global poverty, it is not clear that 
the means, by which they set out to do so, is equally acceptable. For instance 
they argue that what we have been lacking as individuals is the will to act to 
solve global poverty "it is the moral will to use them to the full that has been 
lacking in the affluent nations" (Savulescu 2010: 11). The fact that they assert 
that global poverty is simply a question of will in the affluent world and that 
altruism and beneficence is all that is needed to solve issues as complex as 
global poverty, casts doubt on the credibility of ME. Similar to Singer they 
believe that all it takes to help the global poor are donations from affluent 
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individuals, when in fact what is required is not only will but also critical 
thinking and attention to the best means of poverty alleviation.  
 
To better understand the effect of ‘shallow-pond-thinking’, I will make use of 
the following example. An individual X encounters another asking for 
economic donations to assist poor individuals in country Y. Since X is 
morally enhanced he feels more empathetic, therefore he is inclined to spare 
some coins to help individuals in country Y. The action of individual X being 
beneficent appears to be desirable, but it is often self-defeating. According to 
Savulescu and Persson’s argument, they would be satisfied that the poor 
indivuduals’ need for assistance brought about X’s beneficent reaction, in this 
case to donate money. The problem with that scenario is that something 
important was left out, namely a lack of attention to the best means of poverty 
alleviation. Perhaps Y is impoverished because a dictator is exploiting the 
natural resources of the country and foreign aid might even be fuelling that 
regime. Or as Pogge argues, poverty may have been caused by individuals in 
the affluent world who validated the international borrowing and resource 
privileges to the dictatorship in country Y (See Pogge: 2002).  These are all 
things we ought to consider. The point to make is that when it comes to 
deciding on reasons to alleviate poverty we have to ask two things 1) what is 
grounding our plural moral-duties to the poor. Once we have identified our 
moral obligations we have to ask 2) what are the best means of poverty 
alleviation. 
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The previous example I presented grants that if affluent individuals have in 
fact causally worsened the conditions of the global poor, then we have a 
moral obligation of reparation. The problem is most of our harming 
contributions to the poor (as in the previous case) are perpetrated by actions 
of the state (institutions) not average individuals, therefore how does ME 
intend to accomplish effective poverty relief? To make this point even clearer 
let us assume that moral enhancement has been developed successfully and 
individuals are encouraged to undertake the enhancement procedure. Let us 
further assume that the majority of individuals that go through the process are 
average citizens. Arguably these enhanced individuals would have better 
dispositions to act justly and with empathy. Let us further say that individuals 
working for the harming institutions opt out of moral enhancement. If that is 
the case, then institutions will not change through ME, hence poverty will not 
be effectively alleviated. Even if we insist that the individuals working for the 
harming institutions can also be morally enhanced, we cannot reasonably 
expect individuals working for the harming institutions to go through a moral 
enhancement procedure, since we have to recognize that international 
institutions (not aid relief) have motives and agendas that do not pertain to 
altruistic reasons, nor the protection of human rights in developing countries 
(See Miller: 2010). In other words we can reasonably grant that i) poverty 
alleviation in some instances requires political action, or reform from affluent 
nations ii) in other circumstances affluent individuals harm the poor via 
institutions, and that iii) wealthy individuals not only inadvertently harm the 
poor but sometimes they do so, to benefit economically (See Pogge). 
Therefore because ME purports to alleviate poverty with altruism, but poverty 
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alleviation sometimes requires economic and political reform/action from 
affluent nations, and affluent nations sometimes benefit from those injustices, 
we can safely say that it is unlikely for institutions to change through ME, or 
that ME can successfully alleviate poverty. 
 
One objection to this argument could be that if all average individuals were 
morally enhanced they could put pressure on states and institutions or 
individuals in power to perhaps become morally enhanced to address global 
poverty. This could mean a long-term solution to global poverty, which, as I 
have mentioned, is unlikely although even if they did this, it would not mean 
the global outcome would be morally desirable. As I have previously said, the 
issues around global poverty do not pertain only to the willingness of 
individuals to assist, even if the only duties we might have to the poor are 
positive. Rather, poverty alleviation is complex and moral obligations are 
pluralist. In the next section of this essay I will further explain how simple 
willingness to exercise beneficence can in fact be an immoral action because 
it fails to recognize our moral duties in a global world. 
 
So far I have argued that Savulescu and Persson’s approach to make 
individuals more moral will in fact have unintended consequences because 1) 
it is a moral mistake to equally assign moral obligations to individuals 
without acknowledging other important considerations that help determine 
moral duties and the degree of responsibility, and 2) because arriving to a –
shallow pond thinking– conclusion would lead to undesired moral 
consequences. Finally I have argued that it is a mistake to assume that moral 
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enhancement is a necessary condition to effectively address global poverty. 
The second objection that I will present towards ME is based on Douglas' 
argument of discounting counter-moral emotions for the purpose of poverty 
alleviation. Due to the main focus of this essay, which is the effect ME could 
have on poverty alleviation, I am not going to argue specifically about the 
moral significance of emotions (See Oakley: 1992) and the consequences of 
discounting "undesired" ones. Some have argued these undesired emotions 
are neither intrinsically good nor instrumental; rather they are unique for 
furthering human development (See Jonas: 2010). Although these arguments 
are important for moral and mood enhancements, I will leave them for a 
different discussion. 
 
14. ME according to Douglas 
I have previously discussed in section I (pg. 6) the way Douglas envisions 
ME, and how his argument of discounting counter-moral emotions can be 
extended to promoting pro-social behaviours. These could lead to individuals 
having better motives, and therefore to poverty reduction. “There is clearly 
scope for most people to morally enhance themselves. According to every 
plausible theory, people often have bad or suboptimally good motives. And 
according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important 
problems- such as developing world poverty…-can be attributed to these 
deficits.”  (Douglas 2008: 230) 
 
Before engaging with Douglas’ account and its effect on global poverty, it is 
important to first mention that in order to recognize that our individual 
52 
   
actions can attract specific moral obligations, and that the moral duties we 
have towards others are not exclusive to individuals with which we share a 
spatiotemporal setting, we need, as individuals, the capacity to reason and 
think critically; that is to be fully functioning moral agents. Having said that, I 
will present a case based on Douglas’ account that will allow us to fully 
understand the implications of ME and poverty alleviation.  
 
A morally enhanced individual happens to come across a shop (we will call 
him “consumer”), which is struggling to stay open. He knows the owner 
(“vendor”), who is hardworking but his business is about to go bankrupt. 
Consumer also knows that vendor employs a number of people and that it 
would be undesirable for the shop to close. Because consumer is morally 
enhanced and feels very empathetic he decides to buy something from the 
shop. Before purchasing the product he realizes that the brands vendor sells 
are manufactured with materials from a country ruled by dictatorship that has 
been found to use the profit from the sales of natural resources to maintain 
and abuse its power via violence, enriching only those in power, and hence 
impoverishing the population. Consumer’s likely actions would be: 
 
1) Consumer could help vendor and do nothing about the population in 
source country, hence harming the population. 
2) Consumer could help the population, and not help vendor. 
3) Consumer could help vendor and population or  
4) Consumer could not help vendor or population. 
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In this case we can clearly identify that consumer has no direct connection to 
the state of vendor or the population in source country (assuming consumer 
does not have a special state duty that promotes or aids the dictatorship in 
such country). Vendor is struggling perhaps because of bad luck or the 
economic situation, and the population because they are being taken 
advantage of by an immoral dictator. In this case consumer shares a positive 
duty towards both parties (again assuming that the state of the population is in 
no way related to the actions of the consumer). Here a dilemma arises; 
realistically consumer cannot help vendor and population at the same time. In 
the immediate situation consumer is presented, he can either help one or the 
other. That is, in order to help the population he must refrain from buying a 
product from vendor, if he helps vendor he is harming the population. 
Further, since there is a moral distinction between a positive and a negative 
duty and morally speaking a violation of a negative duty is more stringent 
than a duty to assist when the negative duty has a greater moral risk, then 
consumer ought to help the population by not buying a product from vendor, 
because if consumer buys from vendor, he is violating a negative duty, 
namely further harming the state of the population.  
 
Douglas' view on moral enhancement would most likely be focused on action 
1), since a moral disposition is placed on the individual it would seem 
implausible to think that consumer would in fact discount his emotions of 
empathy towards vendor. Most likely consumer would emotionally react 
based on his enhanced moral dispositions and fail to engage with the difficult 
moral questions, therefore harming the population. It is possible that the 
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nature of the moral enhancement could give equal disposition (empathy) to 
everyone. If that were the case consumer would most likely opt for action 3, 
which is implausible. That is consumer would have to buy a product from 
vendor, and also perhaps provide aid to the population via other means. This 
conclusion is rather strange; on one hand the individual is violating a negative 
duty by harming the population and on the other consumer is discharging a 
positive duty by helping the population. In moral terms if consumer has 
contributed to harm, then consumer’s further action to balance his 
wrongdoing would in fact have to be an act of compensation not of 
beneficence, hence more stringent. It seems that Douglas' vision of moral 
enhancement would fail not only to recognize other individuals outside their 
shared spatiotemporal setting as in the previous case (the population) but also 
to properly enable the individual to discharge and assess their respective 
moral obligations. 
 
There is also an unsettling element of partially losing one’s autonomy in 
Savulescu, Persson and Douglas' argument. The way they envision ME, and 
its effect on humans, renders ME counterproductive, and also limits to some 
extent human autonomy. Non-enhanced individuals use their reason to assess 
and balance any given situation; they also weigh and consider different 
factors in order to determine their moral obligations, and with their capacity 
to reason they are attentive to the best means of poverty alleviation. It then 
seems that the ME that the transhumanists are envisioning in fact is taking 
away some of the elements that make humans fully functioning moral agents. 
Perhaps their argument is worrisome partly because it uniquely focuses on 
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solely discharging positive duties. This is problematic only insofar as the 
duties individuals ought to discharge coincide with positive duties, if not, 
enhanced individuals will be left with the burden of discharging moral 
obligations that do not belong to them. More importantly the real issues will 
not be solved since those issues can only be addressed by non-altruistic 
actions. 
 
The final problem with their argument is that even if individuals only share a 
positive duty to the poor, the means in which these individuals will discharge 
those duties is still problematic. The fact that they think addressing global 
poverty is only an issue pertaining to individuals’ will and emotions is 
troublesome and reflects ignorance towards the complex causes of global 
poverty. Their misguided notion of global poverty could in fact bring even 
more harm to the poor, and even render morally enhanced individuals unable 
to be fully function moral agents. 
 
15. Conclusion 
In this essay I have argued against the trashumanists’ position on moral 
enhancement, specifically against their claim that global issues such as 
poverty would be eradicated through ME. Their arguments fail to effectively 
account for all moral obligations and could potentially lead to harmful 
outcomes. I have also argued that the trashumanists fail to acknowledge the 
distinct relationships individuals have in a global world and instead of making 
individuals more moral it would restrain individuals from properly 
discharging their respective moral obligations, hence affecting their 
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autonomy. The argument that I have presented in this paper is not to say that 
transhumanism and specifically ME is morally undesirable, simply that the 
ME that Savulescu, Persson and Douglas are envisioning for alleviating 
global poverty is unsound and needs revision.  
 
It seems that in order for individuals to be more moral and better in 
addressing global poverty we ought to first recognize that our moral duties 
and obligations are not of one kind. They vary depending on our actions and 
on specific considerations of causality, capacity to effect change, intention 
and epistemic obligations. Once we acknowledge that we have pluralist moral 
duties to alleviate global poverty, we would be better equipped to distribute 
moral obligations to the right actors, and then to effectively fulfil them, which 
is equally important. In order to accomplish this we require something from 
individuals, similar to what Harris argues, namely to exercise our capacity to 
reason and think critically in order to be attentive to the best means of poverty 
alleviation. Perhaps at this point in time the alleged benefits of ME do not 
require any genetic intervention or human enhancement, and it is not as 
elusive as the transhumanists envision. Rather, it is the capacity to reason, and 
the will to effectively reduce poverty by acknowledging our pluralist moral 
duties to the poor, which we simply ought to exercise. New technologies such 
as human enhancement often offer simple solutions to complex issues, but 
before we embark on a journey of no return, we ought to first carefully 
ponder the difficult and complex moral implications. "The message that 
emerges is perhaps not novel: proceed, but with caution. The gaining of 
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genetic knowledge proceeds apace. We must be careful to ensure that it is 
accompanied by the gaining of genetic wisdom (Gray 1996: 8). 
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